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Abstract. Quantum aided Byzantine agreement (QBA) is an important distributed
quantum algorithm with unique features in comparison to classical deterministic and
randomized algorithms, requiring only a constant expected number of rounds in
addition to giving a higher level of security. In this paper, we analyze details of the
high level multi-party algorithm, and propose elements of the design for the quantum
architecture and circuits required at each node to run the algorithm on a quantum
repeater network. Our optimization techniques have reduced the quantum circuit
depth by 44% and the number of qubits in each node by 20% for a minimum five-
node setup compared to the design based on the standard arithmetic circuits. These
improvements lead to a quantum system architecture with 160 qubits per node, space-
time product (an estimate of the required fidelity) KQ ≈ 1.3 × 105 per node and
error threshold 1.1 × 10−6 for the total nodes in the network. The evaluation of the
designed architecture shows that to execute the algorithm once on the minimum setup,
we need to successfully distribute a total of 648 Bell pairs across the network, spread
evenly between all pairs of nodes. This framework can be considered a starting point
for establishing a road-map for light-weight demonstration of a distributed quantum
application on quantum repeater networks.
Keywords: Distributed Quantum Algorithms, Byzantine Agreement, Quantum Repeater
Network (QRN)
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1. Introduction
Besides the numerous attempts to implement a large-scale quantum machine for local
and centralized applications such as efficient factoring [1], there are other vast areas
of research on interesting and unique distributed quantum algorithms with no classical
variants [2, 3, 4]. Perceived advantages with respect to security, time complexity or
communication complexity are sufficient to motivate researchers to focus on design,
implementation and optimization of the algorithms. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
protocols [5, 6] and quantum leader election algorithms [7] are a subset of these
algorithms [4]. However, although detailed, resource-aware analyses of monolithic
algorithms are increasing, the literature for equivalent analysis of distributed algorithms
remains sparse.
A quantum approach for solving the classical problem of Byzantine agreement
is another important distributed quantum algorithm, proposed by Ben-Or and
Hassidim [8]. Their pure-theoretical distributed algorithm terminates in O(1) expected
number of rounds in the presence of a computationally unbounded, full information and
adaptive adversary. There is no similar variant in classical deterministic or randomized
solutions with these unique features at the same time.
Distributed algorithms for solving the Byzantine agreement problem are crucial
for designing fault-tolerant systems in many domains. These algorithms have broad
applications in areas ranging from fault-tolerant real-time and online services [9, 10], to
secure and large-scale peer-to-peer services [11].
Although quantum sharing-based Byzantine agreement can be theoretically faster
and more secure than the classical algorithms, a considerable gap has remained
from the abstract layer to experimental layer. To fill this gap, we must address
challenges ranging from finding a practical architecture for quantum processing elements
in each independent node to consideration of a quantum-based infrastructure for
communication known as a quantum repeater network (QRN), by using entanglement
and teleportation[12]. Analysis of faults in end-nodes and network imperfections
in comparison to the ideal model of the original algorithm (which assumes perfect
computation in each node and a perfect point-to-point quantum communication link
between each pair) increase the complexity of the problem.
We face some questions about the quantum architecture of the abstract algorithm
in addition to computational and communication resources required for running this
algorithm. In this work we have:
• extracted the minimal architecture requirements for the quantum part of the QBA
protocol,
• proposed two optimization techniques for the architecture and circuit for a minimum
setup of QBA with 5 nodes, and
• estimated computation and communication costs for the minimum setup, including
required fidelity.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review classical
and quantum aided Byzantine agreement and quantum repeater networks. Also, the
main criteria for analysis of the QBA algorithm on quantum repeater networks is
presented in this section. A high level analysis of the QBA protocol is presented in
section 3. In section 4, the overall architecture design is proposed. We provide required
optimization techniques in section 5. The assessment of results is shown in section 6.
Finally we conclude the paper in section 7.
2. Background
In this section, we review history and related background. We start with the standard
classical Byzantine agreement and history of Byzantine-tolerant solutions. We continue
with the first scalable quantum sharing-based Byzantine agreement proposed by Ben-or
and Hassidim in [8]. A general review of the network requirements for execution of the
algorithm concludes this section.
2.1. Classical Byzantine agreement
The history of the Byzantine agreement problem goes back to a proposal by Lamport
et al. for defining a more sophisticated form of fault model with active and malicious
behavior, now known as Byzantine faults [13]. Tolerating this form of the fault, which is
stronger than fail-stop faults, requires more computation and communication resources
in a distributed system. To analyze the behavior of this type of fault, Lamport et
al. employed the colorful metaphor of a distributed system as a group of Byzantine
generals arrayed around a city, trying to decide as a group whether to attack or retreat.
It must be assumed that less than third of these generals are traitors (active fault as
an internal adversary). The mission of the distributed generals will be successful if all
the loyal generals agree on a unique command (attack or retreat) in the presence of
inconsistent messages sent by traitors (Byzantine faults), otherwise the protocol fails.
In this problem, all communication is done by messenger. From the communication
point of view, Byzantine agreement is a form of reliable broadcast between multiple
nodes in a network which supports point to point channels between nodes.
2.1.1. Problem Definition and Conditions A distributed system of N processes
Process0, P rocess1, ..., P rocessN−1 is required to agree on a binary decision based on
their initial value. The protocol is executed in the presence of a malicious adversary who
can access some of the faulty processes in the system. A Byzantine agreement protocol
satisfy these three conditions:
• Agreement: After running the protocol, all non-faulty processes Processi must
agree on the same value.
• Validity: If all non-faulty processes start the protocol with the same initial value,
then all non-faulty processes must agree upon that value.
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• Termination: All non-faulty processes will certainly make a decision during
execution of the protocol.
2.1.2. Models and Assumptions Byzantine faults present a more complex type of fault
in comparison to fail-stop (or crash) faults. Faulty components can be controlled by an
adversary with malicious behavior and used to send arbitrary messages to mislead non-
faulty processes. In addition, from the system level point of view, the faulty processes
are active players inside the game. This also increases the complexity of the protocol
compared to other protocols with trusted parties in the game such as key distribution
protocols.
Solutions to the Byzantine agreement problem are always designed with respect to
a chosen set of assumptions. The main categories with impact on the problems are the
timing model of communication between processes, the knowledge held by the adversary,
the behavior and computational power of the adversary:
• Communication model: One of the most important assumptions for solving the
problem is related to timing of communication between processes in the distributed
system. The communication model is divided in two categories: synchronous
and asynchronous. In the synchronous model, all processes are allowed to send
messages only in well-defined communication rounds. Separate communication and
computation phases are considered in each round of the protocol. On the other side,
in the asynchronous communication model, no common clock is required to order
the messages in well-defined communication rounds.
• Behavior of the adversary: The capability of the adversary to have static or dynamic
behavior during the execution of the protocol is also another important criterion.
The adversary is categorized into static or adaptive. In the static case the adversary
chooses her faulty processes before running the protocol. An adaptive adversary
can change her behavior change the set of the faulty processes during the execution
of protocol. In the last model, the only limitation is the upper bound of the number
of faulty processes.
• Computational model: Another important assumption in Byzantine agreement
problem is on the computational power of adversary to misinform the non-faulty
processes. This criterion classify the adversaries into computationally bounded and
computationally unbounded.
• Information model: In the following of computational power of the adversary,
the level of information she can access from distributed system also needs to
be specified. In the first type, private channel, the adversary cannot access all
information generated and communicated during the execution of protocol. The
stronger type is known as full information which means the adversary knows all
the internal state of the processes.
The set of assumptions changes the hardness of the problem. The upper bound on
the number of faulty players is reported in [13].
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2.1.3. Approaches and Solutions Many researchers have studied Byzantine agreement
and proposed solutions for classical computing. The classical algorithms are divided into
deterministic and randomized. Weaknesses and limitations of deterministic Byzantine
agreement algorithms have shifted the focus of research to classical randomized
algorithms. The main advantages of the randomized algorithms are lower round
complexity and stronger security. An important approach for solving Byzantine
agreement uses the concept of a common coin in the protocol. This means a sufficiently
random bit would be available for all the non-faulty processes in the distributed systems.
By using this feature, the solution does not require a trusted third party (TTP), in
contrast to the encryption-based approaches. For implementation of the common coin
feature in the network, many random numbers are generated by the processes in each
round. The random numbers need to be shared and reconstructed using a secret sharing
scheme. In this scheme a dealer shared her secret between all the players in the presence
at most t dishonest players. A general theoretical secret sharing procedure may not
satisfy all the real conditions specially in our problem. The conditions are secret sharing
in presence of the faulty dealer and unavailability of ideal broadcast channel. Therefore
we need to focus on more special versions of secret sharing procedure as described below:
• Verifiable secret sharing: In general, no assumption is made about the
trustworthiness of the dealer. In Byzantine agreement, each process may play the
role of dealer at some points in the procedure. Therefore, to ensure a recoverable
secret is shared by the dealer, we need a verifiable version of the procedure. In
verifiable secret sharing, the dealer passes a commitment procedure and the players
agree on the recoverability of the secret.
• graded verifiable secret sharing: In general all VSS protocols require a reliable
broadcast channel. This is the main motivation for solving a Byzantine agreement
problem and cannot be directly employed in any solutions. Also the existence of
a reliable broadcast channel is not a commonly accepted assumption in a network
research. In these conditions, the gradecast version of VSS is executed. The idea
of graded-VSS is presented by Feldman & Micali in [15]. In this protocol, all the
players execute a gradecast protocol to replace the broadcast channel with a weaker
but still efficient version of agreement.
2.2. Quantum aided Byzantine agreement
One of the first attempts to exploit quantum advantages in a weaker version of agreement
(known as detectable broadcast) as a form of reliable broadcast is presented by Fitzi et.
al. in [14]. Although the work doesn’t solve Lamport’s original problem, the solution is
suitable for a small-scaled distributed systems (with 3 nodes) in a detectable broadcast
application instead of Byzantine agreement.
In this paper, the focus is on Ben-Or and Hassidim’s algorithm. Ben-Or and
Hassidim proposed a scalable solution for creating a quantum aided Byzantine agreement
protocol by modification of Feldman & Micali’s classical probabilistic algorithm [15] to
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share and verify a known quantum state, instead of sharing and verifying classical
random numbers [8]. Ben-Or and Hassidim’s algorithm is based on the following
assumptions:
• There exists a full-duplex ideal quantum channel between each pair of players (end-
nodes). Note that during execution of the algorithm we also need an ideal classical
channel between each pair of the players. The classical channels are used to fill
the need for the broadcast channel, therefore privacy is not necessary for those
channels.
• To tolerate an upper bound on the number of faulty players (t < N/3), the
communication model needs to be synchronous. Each round consists of two separate
phases: a communication phase and a computation phase. For the asynchronous
case, they prove the effectiveness of their algorithm with an upper bound of t < N/4.
• The adversary can be adaptive, full information and computationally unbounded.
At the end of algorithm execution, the agreement between all non-faulty players,
the validity of the output between them and termination of the algorithm (with the
probability of 1) are guaranteed. The algorithm can be analyzed from two points of
view:
(i) Performance analysis under security assumptions: the algorithm requires a constant
number of expected rounds in the presence of a full information adversary with
upper bound of malicious players t among N players (t < N/3). Table 1 shows
the upper bound of the round complexity in classical deterministic [16], classical
randomized [17] and quantum-aided algorithms [8].
(ii) Security analysis under performance assumptions: as another view, the quantum
algorithm is more secure than deterministic and randomized algorithm in the
case of the lowest bound of round complexity. If we analyze the security of
Byzantine agreement protocols for fixed-round algorithms, we get the result similar
to Table 2. There is no fixed-round, deterministic algorithm with the strongest type
of adversaries (adaptive, computationally unbounded and full information) [16]. For
the case of the randomized algorithms, the best available algorithm suffers from the
assumption of communication security between each pair of non-faulty nodes [15].
We will describe the details of the algorithm in addition to its theoretical behavior
in section 3.
Deterministic Randomized Quantum-aided
[16] [17] [8]
Round
Complexity O(t) O(t),Ω(
√
N
logN
) O(1)
Table 1. Round complexity of Byzantine agreement in presence of full-information
adversaries with the upper bound of malicious players (t = O(N))
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2.3. Quantum Infrastructure
In general, execution of fundamentally distributed quantum algorithms requires a
quantum-based solution for computation (at the end nodes) in addition to quantum-
based communication known as a quantum repeater network (QRN) [4, 12, 18, 19, 20]
(Fig. 1). Quantum repeater networks provide an efficient infrastructure for distributed
systems by using entanglement, teleportation and some forms of error detection and
correction. In these networks, information could be represented by entangled states
and a link between two quantum nodes creates entangled states supporting quantum
teleportation. Purification and entanglement swapping repeaters [21], error correction-
based repeaters [22, 24] and quasi-asynchronous [25] repeaters have been proposed for
QRNs [23].
QRN
P1
P2
P3Pi
Pn-1
Pn
...
...
...
...
simple quantum repeater
multi-interface quantum
repeater (router)
quantum end node
(quantum player running QBA)
Figure 1. required elements in Quantum Repeater Networks (QRN) for running
scalable quantum distributed applications
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of distributed fault tolerant protocols,
distributed quantum algorithms and quantum networking, many concepts and criteria
need to be clarified and defined before starting the detailed analysis. This section
presents the basic definitions in these domains.
Deterministic Randomized Quantum-aided
[15] [8]
Adaptive Adv. Yes Yes
Unbounded Adv. No Solution Yes Yes
Full Info. Adv. No Yes
Table 2. Security of fixed-round Byzantine protocols against adaptive,
computationally unbounded and full information adversaries
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2.3.1. Distributed Fault Tolerant Computing In a distributed system, fault tolerant
computation is modeled as a multi-party function evaluation in an unreliable
environment. The unreliability comes from the error models in the presence of faults
or errors. As we mentioned before, based on the error models the fault type can be
classified as fail-stop or Byzantine.
2.3.2. Quantum Architecture and Circuit Design In a general distributed quantum
computation system, each node can execute quantum operations to complete a quantum
protocol. We consider standard quantum circuit models. Also we need to consider the
overall quantum architecture and the required circuits for each section of the protocol.
Due to quantum resource limitations we have to remain aware of the need to design
efficient circuits and architecture by evaluation of the following criteria in circuit models:
• Circuit depth (K): This parameter defines the maximum related operations
required to complete the execution of a circuit treating one- and two-qubit gates
as running in unit time.
• Circuit qubits (Q): This parameter indicate the number of input/output and ancilla
qubits required for preparation and quantum operations within the circuit.
• KQ: This product of K and Q defines an upper bound of the total number of
quantum operations in a quantum circuit.
• (Gtotal): The total number of quantum gates required for execution of the quantum
circuit. We estimate this parameter by Gtotal ≈ KQ.
2.3.3. Quantum Networks Criteria In addition to the local quantum resources in each
node, we have to consider the communication resources and requirements. In general
Bell pairs are the main resources in QRNs, with the following criteria:
• Bell pair Fidelity: This measure shows the level of perfection in Bell state during
the quantum communication. We use F = 〈ψ| ρ |ψ〉, where |ψ〉 is a Bell pair and ρ
is the density matrix of the states created by QRN, so that infidelity 1− F is the
error probability [26].
• Number of Bell pairs: During the communication rounds of a quantum protocol,
each party may send some quantum shares by executing teleportation using the
Bell pairs. We need to be aware of the number of Bell pairs consumed during the
execution of the protocol.
Despite many ongoing demonstrations of quantum key distribution (QKD) without
the benefits of entangled repeater networks, the research on architecture analysis and
design of other promising distributed quantum applications is rare and narrow. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no detailed analysis and design for the quantum-
aided Byzantine agreement algorithm. Therefore, there is a need for analysis of
the minimum requirements in quantum repeater networks for complete execution of
quantum Byzantine agreement. The modeling must be extended beyond that described
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by Ben-Or and Hassidim [8]. In particular, the algorithm as proposed has been analyzed
assuming only pure states, and without reference to the demands made on the repeater
network.
For the remaining sections, the focus will be on finding appropriate answers for the
following questions:
• What are the required quantum resources for QBA protocol?
• How resilient is it to network and gate error?
• Is it practical and attractive in the real world?
• Can we use QBA as an early demonstration application of quantum repeater
networks?
For exploration of an efficient solution, we need to analyze the relevant part of
graded verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS) [15, 28] and the QBA protocol in
detail, and determine the overall architecture of the quantum processing elements as
will be presented in the next section.
3. Detailed Analysis
In the previous section, we introduced the quantum aided Byzantine agreement protocol
and enumerated its features in qualitative terms. In this section we begin the
quantitative analysis of the algorithm.
3.1. Overall QBA Protocol
As shown in Algorithm 1, to run the quantum-aided Byzantine agreement (QBA),
all the end-nodes run the overall agreement protocol with 3 sub-protocols. The overall
protocol is based on the original randomized algorithm [15] and has a constant expected
number of rounds independent of N . The sequential sub-protocols of quantum-aided
Byzantine agreement are Pr, P0 and P1. At the beginning, all nodes i are supposed to
start the protocol with a classical input value bi.
All nodes concurrently and independently execute the first sub-protocol (Pr). This
sub-protocol advances toward an agreement for non-faulty and uncertain nodes. At the
first step node i distributes his classical input value bi to all other nodes in the network.
In this step, each node sends in total N−1 classical bits and may receives N−1 classical
values from other peers. Each node separately counts the received input values. If the
sum of incoming bits was more than 2N/3, she selects bi = 1 as her input value for the
next sub-protocol. In the case the summation of incoming bit is less than N/3, the node
selects bi = 0. In the uncertain condition (> N/3 and < 2N/3), the nodes must run an
oblivious common coin (OCC) procedure. In the algorithm the classical OCC is replaced
with quantum aided oblivious common coin (QOCC). This is the only quantum part
among all of these sub-protocols. As we discuss later, QOCC is a modification of the
original oblivious common coin procedure for independent and random coin flipping.
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After re-evaluation of bi, each node runs the other two sub-protocols P0 and P1
sequentially after Pr. They are pure classical protocols for biasing the outcome of the
coin flipping procedure into zero or one respectively. It has been theoretically proven
that if the non-faulty nodes are in agreement on 1 (or 0) at the start of P1 (or P0), all
of them will successfully terminate the protocol with the same output [15]. Each node
individually terminates the protocol and the other alive nodes retain the last values
reported by nodes that have terminated for updating and re-evaluating their parameter
during the execution of the sub-protocols.
3.2. QOCC
The goal of running the quantum version of OCC (QOCC), similar to its classical
predecessor (OCC), is to generate the common random bit among N nodes to reach
agreement in the condition of uncertainty. In the classical version, this goal is achieved
by sharing N2 random numbers between nodes (each node i acts as a dealer to share her
random value for each node j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N) using graded verifiable secret sharing. Unlike
classical OCC, QOCC doesn’t require privacy for modeling classical channels. Instead,
the protocol takes advantage of quantum channels to share a known quantum state. The
main quantum parts of QOCC are shown in Algorithm 2. The procedure is based on
the modifications suggested in [8]. As shown in the algorithm, we focus on the quantum
part of QOCC and all of the remaining classical computations for identification of faulty
players remain unchanged based on [15].
As shown in Algorithm 2, at the first step a node is selected to act as a dealer (D)
for sharing the following quantum state [8]:
|φ〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
i=0
|i〉 (1)
In the above equation N is the number of end-nodes in the distributed system and
|φ〉 is a known quantum state for producing sufficiently random numbers among the
nodes. To avoid cheating from a faulty dealer, a sub-section of the quantum version of
verifiable secret sharing (VQSS) has been employed.
Independent of the requirements in QBA, verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS)
of any unknown state of (|ψ〉) is a 3-phase protocol with sharing, verification and
reconstruction sub-protocols [28]. To generate a common coin between the distributed
nodes, the first two phases of the protocol can be effectively employed with the difference
of replacing gradecast instead of broadcast [8]. We call this part of the graded VQSS
graded quantum share and verify (GradedQSV). As we discuss in the next section, for
each process the output of the GradedQSV will be an N -qupit register. For each process
i, a qupit
∣∣∣QP (i)(0,0,j)〉 (see Eq. 6) is a random value held by process j representing what
she assumes to be the value that process i has chosen for her. Measurement of each
qupit will present a random value. Note that during the execution of GradedQSV, the
faulty processes will be caught and the random values of non-faulty processes can not
be affected by the faulty processes.
The details of GradedQSV are discussed in the next section.
Resource-aware System Architectural Model for Implementation of QBA 11
Algorithm 1: Quantum aided Byzantine agreement protocol [8] [15]
input : Each processes begins with an input bit bi.
output: Classical bit d with a fairness ρ all other non-faulty Processi successfully
return the same value (bi = d)
1 (∀ processes (i)) ∀j: bj ← null, TerminateNextRound← FALSE
while (1) do
2 SUB-PROTOCOL Pr(bi)
O(N) classical messages to distribute bi
if (!TerminateNextRound) then
Flip distributed quantum coin, ri ←− QOCC(N)
x←−tally(all received bj)
if (x < N/3) then bi ←− 0
else if (x > 2N/3) then bi ←− 1
else bi ←− ri
end
else
return d←− bi
end
3 SUB-PROTOCOL P0(bi) //Classical Protocol
O(N) classical messages to distribute bi
if (!TerminateNextRound) then
x←−tally(all received bj or most recent bj)
if (x < N/3) then send bi ←− 0, TerminateNextRound ←− TRUE
else if (x > 2N/3) then bi ←− 1
else bi ←− 0
end
else
return d←− bi
end
4 SUB-PROTOCOL P1(bi) //Classical Protocol
O(N) classical messages to distribute bi
if (!TerminateNextRound then
x←−tally(all received bj or most recent bj)
if (x < N/3) then bi ←− 0
else if (x > 2N/3) then send bi ←− 1, TerminateNextRound ←− TRUE
else bi ←− 1
end
else
return d←− bi
end
end
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Algorithm 2: Quantum Oblivious Common Coin (QOCC)
Data: NONE
Result: Each Processi acquires the classical outcome of a common quantum coin
(ri)
1 (All processes (i)) Select a dealer D
2 (All processes (i)) FPi ← null //List of faulty processes
3 D prepares a state |φ〉 ←− 1√
N
∑N−1
i=0 |i〉
4 (All processes (i)) (FPi,
∣∣∣S(i)0,0〉)←− GradedQSV (D,N, |φ〉)
5 (All processes (i)) V aluej,i ←−M(
∣∣∣S(j)0,0〉)
6 (All processes (i)) Gradecast(V aluej,i), Update(FPi)
7 (All processes (i)) (∀ j) if (j ∈ FPi) then
SUMij = BAD
8 else
SUMij =
∑
k/∈FPi V aluek,j mod N
9 if ( there exists any j such that SUMij = 0) then
return ri ←− 0
10 else
return ri ←− 1
3.3. GradedQSV
The quantum sharing and verification procedure for QOCC is fundamentally based on
the sharing phase of VQSS [28]. The only difference between the sharing phase of the
original VQSS and GradedQSV is the replacement of the ideal broadcast channel in [28]
with the gradecast procedure in [15]. GradedQSV, as its name implies, is divided into
two subroutines, graded sharing and verification:
3.3.1. Sharing Phase The main quantum state preparation and communication for
GradedQSV during the sharing phase is shown in Fig. 2. The procedure as defined
calls for P-level quantum variables (qupits) with the minimum prime number P which
is larger than number of nodes N (N < P ). In our implementation, we encode them
in dlog2 P e qubits, because Bell pairs support only distribution of qubits, and error
correction circuits for addition, and physical systems are all best developed for two-level
systems.
The sharing phase includes some sub-phases with an agreed upon security
parameter k. This parameter is a built-in engineering parameter for designing the
VQSS-based protocols [28]. The parameter improves the probability of capturing a
dishonest dealer with probability on the order of 1− 2−Ω(k).
In the first level of the sharing phase, as shown in Fig. 2-a, the dealer (D) prepares
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Figure 2. quantum state preparation and transmission during the sharing phase of
gradedQSV for N nodes and security parameter k. Each dot is a node, and each arrow
represents transmission of a group of qupits by active nodes (filled colored nodes) via
teleportation. The topmost node is the dealer. (a) Dealer prepares and encodes initial
quantum state using N(k + 1)2 qupits ((k + 1)2 N-qupit registers). (b) Dealer sends
ith component of each N-qupit register to player i. (c) Each player (i) encodes each
received qupit to a N-qupit register. (d) Each player (i) sends jth component of her
encoded share to player j.
(k + 1)2 N−qupit quantum registers:
∣∣∣SD(m,n)〉 = N⊗
i=1
∣∣∣QP (i)(m,n)〉 (0 ≤ m,n ≤ k) (2)
In the above equation,
∣∣∣SD(i,j)〉 is the (ik + j)-th prepared system of the dealer
((ik + j)-th N -qupit register) and QP
(i)
(m,n) is the i-th qupit of the system
∣∣∣SD(m,n)〉.
The first N -qupit system of the dealer (
∣∣∣SD(0,0)〉) is prepared for encoding the
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original state |φ〉 of the equation (1):
∣∣∣SD(0,0)〉 = ε |φ〉 = 1√N
N−1∑
i=0
ε |i〉 (3)
In the above equation, ε|φ〉 is the encoded state of the original state by using a quantum
error correction code (C) such as the quantum Reed-Solomon code [27].
After that, the dealer assigns the following state to the next k registers:
∀n, 0 < ∀n ≤ k :
∣∣∣SD(0,n)〉 = ∑
a∈ZP
ε |a〉 = ε |0〉+ε |1〉+ ...+ε |P − 1〉(4)
For all of the remaining k(k + 1) systems, the dealer initializes the registers with
the state |0¯〉:
(∀m, 1 < m ≤ k), (∀n, 0 ≤ n ≤ k) :
∣∣∣SD(m,n)〉 = |0¯〉 (5)
After state preparation, the dealer starts to send the QP components of
∣∣∣SD(m,n)〉
systems qubits among the nodes. As shown in Fig. 2-(b), for each node i, QP
(i)
(m,n) of
the system
∣∣∣SD(m,n)〉 is transmitted to the player by the dealer.
The sharing phase continues by encoding and sharing the received qubits between
all nodes. After receiving qupits Q
(i)
P (m,n), each player i encode the qupits to (k + 1)
2
N -qupit systems
∣∣∣Si(m,n)〉 (Fig. 2-(c)):
(0 ≤ m,n ≤ k) :
∣∣∣Si(m,n)〉 = ε ∣∣∣QP (i)(m,n)〉 = N⊗
j=1
∣∣∣QP (i)(m,n,j)〉 (6)
In the above equation,
∣∣∣Si(m,n)〉 and Q(i)P (m,n) are respectively the (mk + n)-th quantum
register of the node i and the i-th qupit of the system
∣∣∣Si(m,n)〉, and ε is the same
encoding scheme used in the previous steps.
By applying the sharing phase, a two level tree has been created and distributed
among the nodes. This tree can be effectively used for verification of the original state
in the next phase.
3.3.2. Verification Phase As we show in the sharing phase, after the dealer encodes and
shares the known state, the other nodes also apply another layer of encoding. In the next
step, all of the non-faulty nodes act to increase their confidence about the correctness
of the shared state. To do this, all of the nodes except the dealer independently execute
the verification phase. In this phase, each node applies some local operations on its
share of the state, then measures some of their qubits and distributes the measurement
results to all of the nodes, including the dealer, using a classical gradecast protocol.
The general view for required assumptions about the inputs and the output results in
quantum verification phase is shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3. An overview of required inputs and output results in block-level verification
diagram. A single quantum state is retained while the other are measured and their
values shared via classical gradecast.
3.4. Measurement
After execution of GradedQSV, the final measurement step is executed in all nodes. In
this step, each node measures the remaining qupits it holds. This will give all nodes
sufficiently random numbers, which are then shared via classical communication. This
is the last quantum stage of QOCC.
GradedQSV and the final measurement operations in QOCC are the only quantum
portions of the complete QBA algorithm. In the next section, we describe a more
complete software architecture for the quantum part of QBA, analyzed to establish
hardware requirements in Sec. 6.
4. Architecture
4.1. Overall Design
To establish the node architecture, we extracted the requirements for a minimum
quantum setup for QBA. We require 5 nodes and need to set the prime number P
to be 7 for this setup. The security parameter (k) is selected to have the value two.
These parameters lead to a minimum classical-quantum distributed system with five
nodes which tolerates one malicious node inside the system.
We target a resource-aware design for the proposed architecture. In this approach,
the focus is to minimize the quantum resources for implementation of QBA protocol.
In view of the fact that a built-in quantum error correction is employed in QBA, we
improved the design without using another layer of QEC in the architecture. Instead
of using additional costly QEC, we look for an estimation of required gate error (g) to
implement the protocol by considering the following equation:
g << 1/Gtotal ≈ 1/KQ (7)
This means that for running QBA without using explicit QEC in the architecture,
we need to demonstrate the protocol with gate error lower than g.
The communication design of the system for execution of QBA protocol is based
on the following assumptions:
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• Both reliable classical and quantum channels exist between each pair of nodes. The
classical channels are used in QBA to distribute the measured results. In contrast to
the necessity of private classical channels in the classical approach, the no-cloning
theorem of quantum states helps QBA to ignore the privacy assumption of the
classical channels.
• For quantum communication, the communication resource is Bell pairs. We focus
on Bell states instead of W state or GHZ states in consideration of the capabilities
of quantum repeater networks.
• The Bell pairs may have fidelity F < 1.0.
The above assumptions result in a complete graph topology. Although the protocol
requires an expected constant number of rounds to be successfully completed, each
round is computationally intensive, in addition to the high rate of quantum and classical
communications. This requires long-lived connections between each pair of nodes.
4.2. Quantum Encoder
Since the encoding and sharing scheme for the data qubits is generally similar for the
dealer and the other players, the general architecture is the same. Each player applies
the encoding scheme as shown in Fig. 4. As described in the previous section, for the
sharing phase we need two-level encoding. The first one is applied by the dealer and
the last one is applied by other players.
The sharing phase of GradedQSV consists of a large number of calls to the Encoder
circuit, and a large number of teleportations to share the qupits. For each player i, the
Encoder circuit takes a qupit to be encoded and N−1 |0〉P ancillae, and creates the state∣∣∣SD(m,n)〉. As described in Sec. 3.3.1, the dealer creates (k + 1)2 qupits, corresponding
to Equations 1- 6, each of which are now run through the encoder.
4.3. Quantum Verifier
Before the verification phase, each player has distributed the encoded qubits and in this
phase the non-faulty nodes can verify the correctness of the original share (encoded by
the dealer). In this phase, we need to extract the required quantum modules for unitary
transform U of Fig. 3. In general, for every player i unitary transform U is composed
of N separated verifiers with the unitary transform U (i,j). Each U i,j is also decomposed
to (k + 1)(k + 2) transforms U (i,j)m,n (0 ≤ m ≤ k + 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ k + 1).
Here, U (i,j)m,n = CX
bm+1 . For all m,n such that (0 ≤ m ≤ k− 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ k) we have:∣∣∣QP (i)(n,0,j)〉 ∣∣∣QP (i)(n,m+1,j)〉 → CXbm+1 ∣∣∣QP (i)(n,0,j)〉 ∣∣∣QP (i)(n,m+1,j)〉 (8)
In the above equation, bl are the classical values (for classical control) and CX
bl is
modular multiplication and addition with the following described as below [28]:
CXbl |V 〉 |W 〉 = |V 〉 |V + blW mod P 〉 (9)
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For the case of m = k and ∀n, 0 ≤ n ≤ k, U (i,j)m,n is determined as below:
U (i,j)m,n :
∣∣∣QP (i)(n,0,j)〉→ QFT (∣∣∣QP (i)(n,0,j)〉) = ∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(n,0,j)〉 (10)
U (i,j)m,n is defined as below for the case of m = k + 1 and ∀n, 0 ≤ n < k − 1:
U (i,j)m,n :
∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(n,0,j)〉 ∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(n+1,0,j)〉→ CXb′n+1 ∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(0,0,j)〉 ∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(n+1,0,j)〉 (11)
And finally unitary transform of U
(i,j)
k+1,k, (m = k + 1, n = k) is applied to reverse
the Fourier transform as below:
U
(i,j)
k+1,k :
∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(0,0,j)〉→ QFT−1(∣∣∣Q∗P (i)(0,0,j)〉) = ∣∣∣QP (i)(0,0,j)〉 (12)
The required architecture for each node in a network with N = 5 nodes is shown in
Fig. 5. Each player is required to have a quantum verifier module (each contains U (i,j))
for every other node in the network. As shown in the figure, CXb is one of the main parts
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Figure 4. Block-level circuit diagram for the sharing phase of GradeQSV, showing
the Dealer and the circuits it executes on the left, and only one of the N players, i, on
the right. On the left, the dealer begins with the qupit |φ〉P in the top line (1 and line
2 of Algo. 2), k superimposed numeric state qupits, and k(k + 1) zero state qupits. It
executes (k + 1)2 Encoder circuits, then teleports one qupit from the output of each
Encoder to player i. Each player creates additional ancillae and applies the Encoder
to each qupit it received from the dealer. Of the resulting N2(k + 1)2 qupits on the
right hand side, each player will keep (k+ 1)2 and teleport the rest to the other N − 1
nodes (Fig. 2-(d)).
Resource-aware System Architectural Model for Implementation of QBA 18
Verification
Phase
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
C-Xb1
C-Xb1
C-Xb1
C-Xb2
C-Xb2
C-Xb2
QFT
QFT
QFT
M M
M M
M M
C-X b1
M
C-X b1
M
QFT -1
QRN
⟩|QP(i)(0,0,j)
Figure 5. In the verification phase, the verifier circuit is run on the collection of
qupits received during the sharing phase.
of the quantum verifier module. In the next section we will present an efficient multiplier
mod 7 for reducing the cost of this module. The other main components of the quantum
verifier consist of the quantum Fourier transform (QFT ) and its inverse (QFT−1). The
required module for these operations is presented in Fig. 5. Note that in the middle
of verification phase, we required the measured outputs of CXbi circuits. As shown in
Fig 3, the results of measurements are classically gradecast to verify the recoverability
of the encoded original state |φ〉. The remaining share QP (i)(0,0,j) are reserved for the final
measurement described in the next section.
4.4. Measurement
After finalizing GradedQSV, and in the last stage of QOCC, the only internal operation
is measurement of the remaining qubits. Since no other quantum gates are required,
it may be considered to be the simplest part of the protocol. But maintaining the
remaining qubits is considered to be an important challenge for this phase. The result
of the measurement will be gradecast by the corresponding node.
5. Efficient Implementation
In this section we present some techniques for implementing and optimizing the quantum
architecture level and quantum circuit level. For the first level, we apply resource sharing
in a pipelined approach, and for the last one we propose an efficient low-cost modulo 7
classical-quantum multiplier.
5.1. Pipeline and resource sharing
To reduce the number of required quantum operations, reusing the quantum modules
should be considered. In this technique, it is not required that all the modules be
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available at the same time. In the verification circuit, since multiplication and addition
(CXb) and QFT (QFT−1) are dependent on complete execution of the previous CXb
and QFT (QFT−1) circuits, a resource sharing scheme has been designed to reduce the
number of quantum modules and active number of qubits. As shown in Fig. 7, we divide
the execution time into 7 stages and in each stage a subsection of the required quantum
operations is bound to the designed quantum modules. Although the overall execution
time is increased by one stage in comparison to full circuit architecture execution time,
the number of required quantum modules decreased dramatically. By applying this
technique, in each verification module and in the worst case, we need to implement two
CXb and one QFT and/or QFT−1 concurrently, instead of 8 active CXb modules, 4
active QFT and QFT−1 modules.
In addition to reduction of the number of quantum modules, this optimization
technique can reduce the required number of active qubits in the architecture.
5.2. Multiplication Mod 7
As shown in the previous section, the most challenging computational part of the
quantum modules is the circuit for computation of multiplication and addition modulo
P (CXb). The concept for standard design of quantum circuit for computation of
modular multiplication is based on modular addition. Motivated by designing efficient
modular multiplication for the integer factorization application, many researchers have
proposed low cost quantum circuits [29, 30, 31]. The standard approach for computation
of |x〉 |0〉 → |x〉 |ax mod N〉 (for classical integers N and a and quantum variable x) is
using computation of modular addition |x〉 |y〉 → |x〉 |x+ y mod N〉.
Although this problem is similar to the state of the art modular multiplication (and
modular addition), the concept of computation and the resulting circuit may be different
from the state of the art computations and related circuits. The first difference is
related to modulo computation. For integer factorization, the modulo N is a parameter
and can be changed for each new session. In contrast, the modulo P depends on the
upper bound of number of the players in QBA protocol, and can be considered a fixed
number for a designed quantum distributed system. The next difference is related
to the classical operand a in integer factorization and classical random numbers bi in
modular multiplication and addition circuit of the verification module. For the first
one the operand can be implicitly considered in the circuit design, but for the last one,
the random number must be present as a parameter for the modular multiplication.
These differences cause a need for rethinking novel quantum circuits to be used in the
QBA protocol. Thus we have proposed a multiplier modulo 7 for the minimum setup.
We haven’t followed the standard approach in integer factorization and attempted to
compute the multiplication modulo 7 directly. The proposed modular multiplier is
shown in Fig. 6. Note that 0 < b < 7 in the protocol and the enable classical signals
for 3 swap gates (ENSwapi) and not gates (ENNot) are based on the following Boolean
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Figure 6. Multiplier modulo 7
functions:
ENSwap1 = b¯2b1b¯0 + b¯2b1b0 + b2b¯1b¯0 + b2b¯1b0
ENSwap2 = b¯2b1b¯0 + b2b¯1b0
ENSwap3 = b¯2b1b0 + b2b¯1b¯0
ENNot = b¯2b1b¯0 + b2b¯1b¯0 + b2b1b¯0
6. Results for the minimum setup
In this section the required quantum resources have been analyzed and enumerated for
the minimum setup described in section 4. For the analysis the following criteria have
been considered:
• Number of qubits per node
• Number of quantum operations (including total quantum cost and circuit depth)
• Number of Bell pairs consumed by the application
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6.1. End-node Quantum Cost
For analysis of quantum cost in the end-nodes, we consider the basic quantum circuits to
be used in the architecture. The most complex quantum operations are in the verification
phase. We used the basic quantum circuits for 3-qubit QFT and QFT−1. As we
described in the previous section, the most challenging operation is related to modular
multiplication and addition (CXb). We consider five different designs for analysis of the
quantum depth and total quantum cost in the verifier module:
• VBE96: use the adder, modulo adder and modulo multiplier proposed in [29].
• CDKM04: replace the the basic adder of [29] by the second adder proposed in [30].
• VI05: use quantum addition and modulo addition circuits of CDKM04. The only
difference is replacement of the modulo multiplier in [29] by the multiplier proposed
in [31].
• Custom: use the proposed multiplier modulo 7 instead of the previous standard
design.
• Custom+Pipelined: apply the proposed pipeline technique and using the circuit in
the previous design.
To evaluate the total cost of the required quantum operations, we estimate the
required quantum gates based on the cost of CNOT as the basic gate.
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QFT
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M M
M M
M M
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Figure 7. Parallel processing of quantum operation in verification phase for reduction
of quantum cost and the number of required active qubits.
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Phase Quantum Module Circuit Number of qubits
Module Depth (per node)
Sharing Encoder 59 135
Verification CXbi 157 180
Verification QFT 5 15
Table 3. Quantum computational cost of basic quantum circuits and their required
qubits during execution of the main phases of graded quantum share and verify
(GradedQSV). The [[5,1,3]] quantum error correction code in [32] is employed for
encoding scheme (ε).
Due to reduction of the number of ancilla by using the proposed multiplier modulo
7, we gain at least 20% improvement in this parameter. Fig 8 plots the number of qubits
and total depth of the quantum circuit.
number of qubits per node
ci
rc
ui
t
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h
Figure 8. The number of required qubits per node versus the total required depth of
the quantum circuit for the different designs. Points toward the lower left are better.
In this paper, except the built-in quantum error correction (C), we did not employ
any other quantum error correction scheme for the architecture because the target was to
present a lightweight and simple design. This architecture can be effectively optimized
to be demonstrated in experiments.
We deliberately look to solve the problem at small scale, without employing
additional QEC. The attempt is to minimizeKQ parameter to ensure that the parameter
is significantly less than the error threshold in the emerging technologies. In this
situation, the error threshold for local gates must be considered as an important
criterion. We evaluate the error threshold based on the estimation of the product
KQ. We also employed encoding circuit of the [[5,1,3]] quantum error correction code
described in [32] for applying encoding scheme ε. The result is shown in Fig. 9.
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Figure 9. Threshold of the local gate error for the total design. Higher is better.
Main Phase End-Node Source Destination Quantum Cost Classical Cost
Algorithm Comm Type Node Node (Bell Pairs) (Bits)
GradedQSV Sharing Unicast Dealer All Nodes 108 0
GradedQSV Sharing Unicast Node(i) Node (j) 540 0
GradedQSV Verification Gradecast All Nodes All Nodes 0 14160
GradedQSV Verification Gradecast All Nodes All Nodes 0 4720
QOCC Measurement Gradecast All Nodes All Nodes 0 2360
total - - - - 648 21240
Table 4. Quantum traffic cost (Bell pairs) and classical traffic cost during the
execution of the quantum operations in QBA. Note that only the classical cost related
to the result of quantum blocks is shown and the classical communications for updating
list of faulty-nodes is neglected in the table.
6.2. Network Traffic Cost
To estimate traffic cost, we divide the result into two sections: The first one is related to
the quantum communication cost which is based on transmission of Bell pairs between
each pair of nodes in the network. We also consider the cost for sending classical
messages during the execution of the protocol. The results are shown in Table 4.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we described an optimized quantum architecture for end-nodes in quantum
aided Byzantine agreement protocol. The node architecture in the protocol is not as
complex as that required for e.g. factoring a large number but at minimum of 165 qubits
per node, the experimental demands are substantial compared to current capabilities.
In addition, the number of required Bell pairs is in the order of the number required for
quantum key distribution.
During the design process we found that modular classical-quantum multiplication
and fully modular quantum addition are the most critical parts of the quantum
computation in the QBA protocol. This requires a novel circuit design that is fully
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depends on the minimum prime number P satisfy the inequality (N < P ). The other
requirement is related to long lived qubits to maintain the shared and encoded qubits.
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